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Economists have suggested that the quality of higher education is not independent of the
sources of funds used to fund that education. This paper examines the relationship
between student measures of teaching quality and institutional revenue sources. The
results indicate that a greater reliance on private subsides is associated with higher
measures of teacher quality. A greater reliance on public subsidies, however, leads to
lower teacher quality ratings. The importance of these results for shaping public policy
decisions is also discussed. [JEL I22, L30, H42]
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“The endowments of schools and colleges have necessarily diminished
more or less the necessity of application in the teachers. Their subsistence,
so far as it arises from their salaries, is evidently derived from a fund
altogether independent of their success and reputation in their particular
professions.” (Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Causes and Consequences
of the Wealth of Nations, 1993 World Classics Edition,  p. 421)
1. Introduction
More than two hundred years have passed since Adam Smith argued that the
performance of institutions of higher education is influenced by the sources of their
operating revenue. Economists and public policy-makers continue to debate the merits of
private and public subsidies to higher education. However, there has been little research
that examines the empirical relationship between the teaching performance of institutions
of higher education and the sources of funds. This paper makes use of teaching quality
ratings based on student surveys as a measure of performance.
 While student satisfaction is only one of many possible measures of academic
performance, it is still an important measurement of educational performance. Students
purchase education for many reasons. Higher education can be though of as both a pure
consumption good and as an investment in human capital. Students expect to obtain
satisfaction from the consumption of the good and/or higher future earnings as a result of
the consumption of the good. It is important to measure both the consumer satisfaction
and consumer investment returns from the consumption of the good. The data in this
paper focus on student satisfaction and not investment returns. The results confirm that
the source of educational funds is related to students’ perception of educational quality in
an important manner.2. University performance, behavior and the source of funds
2.1 Tuition vs. private subsidies
Smith’s observations were based on a comparison of the educational system of
Scotland, where masters’ incomes were highly dependent on the number of students they
could attract, with that of England, where schools were supported primarily by large
endowments. Smith believed the latter system destroyed both the incentives to teach well
and to teach useful subjects.
1 A related argument is that private donations are used to
produce attributes desired by donors but not by students.
2 In some cases private donors or
foundations may require that universities conduct certain activities or make specific
changes that reduce educational quality.
Modern arguments concerning educational funding have been more accepting of
private subsidies as a substitute for tuition. A university’s ability to use endowment funds
to ignore market demands is reduced if the institution requires expansion or if educational
costs are rising.  The competition for new donations forces the school to compete on
those margins that attract additional donations. If donations are related to teaching
quality, then a greater reliance on private donations may increase teaching quality
(Friedman and Friedman (1979)). If the increased spending is devoted to those attributes
that improve educational quality, then it should also lead to improved performance.
2.2 Tuition vs. public subsidies
The modern version of Smith’s argument against endowments has been refocused
on the influence of public subsidies to higher education. Friedman and Friedman (1979),Alchian (1968), and West (1995) argue that government funding has a negative effect on
educational quality for reasons similar to Smith’s opposition to private endowments.
However, supporters of government subsidies to public education argue that the subsidies
increase the quantity and quality of education provided. In addition to insulating faculty
and administrators from the forces of the market, public subsidies may have effects on
educational quality (e.g. Stubblebine (1965), Peltzman (1973), and Lindsay (1976)).
The ultimate impact of government funds is dependent on the political
environment in which they are determined. State government funds for higher education
come primarily through direct appropriations to state institutions. The subsidy allows
these institutions to set tuition levels below the average cost of providing the education.
In order to satisfy the preferences of the median voter, state legislators have an incentive
to make education available to as many of their constituents as possible.
3  While the
subsidies may successfully increase educational access, they are likely to decrease the
average quality of education. Local government funding is predicted to have similar
effects because the nature of the funding and the incentives of local politicians are
similar. It is important to note that a decrease in teaching quality does not mean that these
subsidies do not achieve their purpose. Public subsidies may also increase the quality of
education on other margins even if they result in lower teaching quality.
 Federal government funds to higher education are normally in the form of grants
from government agencies and not direct federal appropriations. Therefore, the pressures
to increase the number of students and provide the education desired by the median voter
are likely to be less intense. However, an increased reliance on federal funds will reduce
the reliance of student based revenue sources. The most common criticism of federalfunding is that teaching quality is lowered as the increased research activity diverts
attention away from undergraduate teaching (e.g. Anderson (1992)). An alternative
argument in favor of increased federal funding for research is that teaching and research
activities are complements. If less than the optimal level of research would take place in
the absence of such subsidies, then subsidizing research may increase teaching quality.
Again, even if these subsidies decrease teaching quality, they may promote other valuable
social goals or increase educational quality on other margins.
There are three potential effects of private and public subsidies to higher
education. The subsidies will likely increase the total resources devoted to education,
which may improve teaching quality. However, if these subsidies allow administrators
and teachers to be less responsive to student desires, then the quality of teaching may
decrease as a result of higher subsidies. Finally, if these subsidies are designed to satisfy
the goals of private donors or politicians and not educational goals, then there is no
reason to expect them to improve teaching quality. If fact, these alternative goals may not
be consistent with increased teaching quality.
3. The data
The Princeton Review produces an annual Student Advantage Guide to the Best
310 Colleges that rates colleges on many attributes. Two of the ratings given for each
college are “profs interesting” and “profs accessible.” These ratings are based on the
average student response to the questions, “In general how good are your instructors as
teachers?” and “In general, how accessible are your instructors outside the classroom?”.
The numerical rating reported in the Student Advantage Guide is a number assigned toeach institution by the Princeton Review staff based on student responses to a multiple
response on-campus survey.
4 Each school is given a score between 0 and 100 with the
scores representing the traditional academic grades (90-100 A, 80-89 B, etc.). The
measure is based upon but is not the actual student responses. Surveys were initially
conducted annually at each institution. However, the high degree of correlation between
annual responses led the Princeton Review to survey each campus at least once during
the three years preceding the publication of the survey. Table 1 presents the summary
statistics for the two teaching quality variables. Both variables range from 60 to the upper
90s with a mean of 80.
Insert Table 1 About Here
Admittedly, the measure of teaching quality used here concerns the current
students’ satisfaction with narrowly defined aspects of teaching. However, these
measures allow us to focus on attributes of education ￿ classroom teaching skills and the
level of student and faculty interaction ￿ that are valued by students but may not be
associated with standardized test scores or future earnings. While this aspect of teaching
quality is more consistent with Smith’s discussion, the results should be considered in
conjunction with other analysis that considers alternative measures of academic success.
That the teaching quality data is only available for a non-random subset of all colleges
and universities also limits the generalization of this analysis.
5 However, a sample
composed of those institutions where teaching is thought to be more highly valued seems
appropriate in this case.The 1997 edition of the Student Advantage Guide reports data from the previous
academic year (1995-1996) for 310 colleges determined by The Princeton Review to be
the best based on teaching quality and other attributes. In addition to the survey data, the
student-faculty ratios for each school were obtained from the Student Advantage Guide.
The average institution in the sample had 13.34 students per faculty member.
  The U. S. Department of Education conducts an annual survey of sources and
uses of funds for institutions of higher education within the Integrated Postsecondary
Education Data System (IPEDs). All of the financial data (revenues, expenditures, and
tuition) were taken from this source. Complete and reliable financial data were available
for the 1994-1995 academic year for 299 colleges that were included in the teaching
survey.
6  Table 1 provides information on the average tuition per student, teaching
expenditures per student and the sources of funds. On average, tuition is the most
important source of revenues for the schools in the sample. The second most important
source, auxiliary enterprises, is also a student revenue source (dorms, food service,
bookstores, etc.).
IPEDs contains revenues and expenditures by institutional total. The sample
contains a variety of types of institutions. For example some of the institutions operate
large-scale graduate programs while other institutions focus on undergraduate education.
In an attempt to ensure that these differences are not captured by other variables,
institutional type is specifically controlled for in the analysis. The sample is broken into
four types based on the highest level and types of degrees offered: doctoral degree
granting institutions, masters degree granting institutions, liberal arts colleges, and
specialty schools (arts, music, engineering, etc.). These classifications are based onCarnegie Classifications that were obtained from IPEDs.
7 Table 1 indicates that 44.1% of
the institutions grant doctoral degrees, 38.8% are liberal arts colleges, 12.4% offer a
master’s degree as the highest level of offering, and 4.7% are specialty schools.
4. The model and results
In order to test the relationship between educational quality and the non-tuition
sources of funds, the ‘profs interesting’ and ‘profs accessible’ variables are regressed on
the sources of funds variables, dummy variables for institution type, and the institution’s
age. The percentage of total dollar revenues from tuition is omitted from the model to
avoid the problem of linear dependence among the financing variables.
The results presented in Table 2 indicate that a greater reliance on private sources
of income and endowment income have a positive impact on the teaching quality
variables. A greater reliance on endowment income is associated with increased teaching
quality. A one per-cent increase in the ratio of endowment income to tuition revenues
increases the teaching ratings by 17 and 19 points. Other private sources of income have
a similar effect but it is only significant for the ‘profs interesting’ rating. The inability to
separate private donations from private contracts may obscure the full effects of private
giving.
Insert Table 2 About Here
A greater reliance on state and federal government funding is negatively and
significantly related to the teaching quality variables.
8 The coefficient estimates indicatethat a similar increase in the ratio of federal government funding has a larger negative
influence than an increase in the ratio of state government funds. However, given the
greater average reliance on state government funds and larger variation in this reliance
across the institutions in the sample, the degree of reliance on state government funds is
responsible for a much larger share of the actual variation in teaching quality ranks across
institutions.
The percentage of funds that come from auxiliary enterprises and other revenue
sources have a positive and significant effect on teaching quality. The effects are
significant for the accessibility measure. The auxiliary revenue sources come primarily
from the students. Hence, schools that rely more heavily on funds from student housing,
bookstores, campus dining and related student services are more sensitive to meeting
student demands. Other revenues come from many sources so their influence is more
difficult to interpret. Hospital revenues are negatively related to teaching quality but the
effect is not significant.
Liberal arts colleges claim to devote greater attention to teaching undergraduate
students. The results suggest that this is true; a liberal arts college is expected to have
ratings that are five to six points higher than non-liberal arts colleges. Specialty schools
have lower teaching ratings on average but the effect is only significant for the ‘profs
accessible’ variable. Institutions offering doctoral degrees have significantly lower
teaching ratings. The presence of a doctoral program may signal a greater ability of
faculty members to substitute research and consulting activities for undergraduate
teaching. Classes at these institutions may be taught by less experienced graduate
students instead of regular faculty members. There may also be other characteristics ofthese institutions not directly related to graduate students that are responsible for the
lower ratings. The age variable is not significant suggesting that age has little effect in
conjunction with the other independent variables.
One potential problem with using students’ perceptions to measure quality is that
the students’ ratings may be based on their expectations. Students at less prestigious
institutions may have lower expectations concerning teaching quality. In order to control
for this problem, the average tuition per student is added as an explanatory variable. The
average tuition paid by students is positively and significantly related to performance.
With the exception of the state government financing variable, the financing variables
that were significant in the original specification are still significant and exhibit similar
effects. There is a collinearity problem with tuition and state government revenues that
may explain the lack of significance as tuition is significantly lower at state supported
institutions.
 An alternative explanation for these results is that they are not measuring the
effects of financing but the total expenditures of the institution. In order to check the
robustness of these results, the student-faculty ratio and teaching expenditures per student
variables are included in the model as independent variables
9. The student-faculty ratio is
negative and significant in for both teaching quality measures while teaching
expenditures are positively and significantly related to performance. This suggests that
student satisfaction with teaching quality is related to student-faculty ratios. The results
for the public subsidy variables are the same with the additional controls. However, the
private giving variable is no longer significant in “profs accessible’ model and the
endowment income variable is no longer significant in the “profs interesting’ model.To the extent that the estimates for the other expenditure variables differ, it is
possible that the expenditure variable and the student faculty ratio may also be influenced
by the sources of funds. For example, if higher endowment income results in lower
student-faculty ratios and higher teaching expenditures per student, then this procedure
may obscure the full effects of endowment income. In any case, the primary results
concerning the effects of educational financing are not driven by differences in resources.
The results for the specification including average tuition are similar except that the
teaching expenditures variable is no longer significant. This is not surprising in that
higher tuition is generally associated with higher teaching expenditures.
5. Conclusions
As suggested by Smith, the results presented in this paper do find a relationship
between revenue sources and teaching quality. However, a greater reliance on private
funding and endowment income does not lead to lower teaching quality ratings as
predicted. The results suggest private subsidies allow schools to be more selective and to
devote more resources to individual students. Recent studies of higher education
(McPherson, Schapiro and Winston (1993), Clotfelter (1996)) indicate that many elite
institutions have attempted to do exactly this in recent years. These results suggest that
such efforts increase teaching quality as predicted by Friedman and Friedman (1979).
Increased reliance on either state or federal government funding is associated with
teaching quality. Consistent with the predictions of Stubblebine (1964) and Lindsay
(1976), educational policy outcomes decided in the political market place are not likely to
achieve the outcomes desired by the ultimate consumers of the subsidized good. Inaddition, by reducing the correlation between an institution’s ultimate success and the
satisfaction of the students, the government may allow the institution to pay less attention
to student demands. However, these results should be interpreted with some caution. An
increased reliance on either state or federal funding may be related to other institutional
characteristics not controlled for in the analysis. These characteristics, and not the sources
of funding, may be the primary influences driving student satisfaction.
The public policy implications of these results are dependent on the purpose of
educational subsidies. If the goal of government policy is to increase the quality of
education, then alternative policies may be needed. However, if increasing access to
education or enhancing basic research is the primary goal of public subsidies, then
alternative programs may not be necessary. However, student perceptions of teaching
quality are significantly impacted by the source of educational funds.
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Summary statistics
Standard 
Mean deviation Minimum Maximum
Institutional characteristics
‘profs interesting’ 79.74 12.09 60.00 99.00
‘profs accessible’ 79.78 12.05 60.00 98.00
Student-faculty ratio 13.34 3.73 6.00 27.00
Age 132.27 49.49 27.00 360.00
Teaching expenditures $7,753 $5,259 $1,765 $47,677
Tutition $11,297 $5,709 $692 $26,453
Institution type
Liberal arts college 0.388 0.488 0.000 1.000
Doctoral institution 0.441 0.497 0.000 1.000
Master's institution 0.124 0.330 0.000 1.000
Specialty institutions 0.047 0.212 0.000 1.000
Sources of funds
(as a % of all revenues)
Tuition  44.3% 20.5% 2.4% 80.2%
Endowment income  6.0% 7.9% 0.0% 69.2%
Private giving  7.4% 5.4% 0.0% 40.0%
Federal grants 8.2% 7.0% 1.0% 35.4%
Federal appropriations 0.3% 1.7% 0.0% 27.6%
State grants 1.6% 1.7% 0.0% 9.2%
State appropriations  9.3% 15.8% 0.0% 56.2%
Local grants 0.2% 0.7% 0.0% 5.8%
Local appropriations   0.0% 0.4% 0.0% 6.3%
Auxiliary enterprises 13.9% 6.1% 0.0% 42.9%
Independent operations 0.9% 6.1% 0.0% 79.7%
Hospital revenues 3.3% 10.8% 0.0% 65.6%
Sales & services 1.6% 3.9% 0.0% 35.9%
Other sources 2.9% 3.2% 0.0% 41.0%Profs Profs Profs Profs Profs Profs Profs Profs
intesting accessible intesting accessible intesting accessible intesting accessible
Private giving 25.25 11.72 26.85 13.17 18.31 6.17 25.24 13.04
p-value 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.10 0.03 0.47 0.00 0.13
Endowment income 16.62 19.28 19.81 22.18 9.47 13.50 17.44 21.41
p-value 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.03 0.01 0.00
State government -11.76 -13.04 2.22 -0.32 -8.11 -9.96 3.02 1.08
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.58 0.94 0.01 0.00 0.48 0.80
Federal government -37.77 -42.24 -34.97 -39.70 -39.96 -43.79 -33.71 -37.58
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Local government -25.92 -20.18 -25.39 -19.69 -23.36 -17.75 -21.32 -15.72
p-value 0.63 0.71 0.62 0.71 0.66 0.74 0.68 0.76
Auxiliary revenues 13.93 14.70 21.84 21.90 19.25 19.28 25.25 25.23
p-value 0.10 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00
Independent revenues 0.58 3.32 -4.19 -1.02 -19.39 -12.36 -4.90 2.02
p-value 0.93 0.64 0.53 0.88 0.05 0.21 0.63 0.85
Hospital revenues -2.60 -5.40 0.71 -2.38 -5.28 -7.46 0.63 -1.59
p-value 0.57 0.24 0.87 0.59 0.25 0.11 0.90 0.74
Sales revenues 7.11 15.92 7.86 16.61 -6.78 5.35 10.15 22.16
p-value 0.54 0.17 0.47 0.14 0.61 0.69 0.45 0.11
Other revenues 25.85 35.32 24.24 33.85 3.53 17.78 22.89 36.99
p-value 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.81 0.24 0.14 0.02
Liberal arts 5.08 5.73 2.08 3.00 4.01 4.86 2.06 2.93
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.05
Specialty institution -0.56 -5.42 -2.19 -6.91 -2.29 -6.82 -2.53 -7.06
p-value 0.80 0.02 0.31 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.25 0.00
Doctoral institution -7.22 -5.71 -8.40 -6.78 -6.96 -5.45 -7.80 -6.29
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Age 0.0003 -0.0022 -0.0081 -0.0099 -0.0057 -0.0071 -0.0089 -0.0103
p-value 0.97 0.80 0.33 0.24 0.50 0.41 0.29 0.23
Tuition  ($1000s) 0.617 0.561 0.555 0.551
p-value 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003
Teaching expenditures
per student ($1000s) 0.33 0.26 -0.04 -0.11
p-value 0.03 0.09 0.84 0.54
Student faculty ratio -0.43 -0.37 -0.33 -0.27
p-value 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.09
intcept 79.86 80.43 72.57 73.80 85.32 85.11 77.40 77.24
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R-Square 0.691 0.688 0.7186 0.7109 0.709 0.7002 0.723 0.7141
Observations 299 299 299 299 299 299 299 299
The relationship between teaching quality and the source of educational funds
Dependent variable
Table 2Notes to Table 2: The financing variables are measured as a percentage of all institutional revenues. The
state, federal and local government variables represent the total of appropriations, grants and contracts from
that source. The government variables also include financial aid expenditures from these sources.
Eliminating financial aid expenditures from the total does not alter the important results.Notes
1 Smith’s view was not universal among the classical economists. See West (1964) for
further discussion.
2 See Lindsay (1976) and the discussion later in this paper for a similar argument with
regard to public subsidies.
3 In related works Sisk (1981) and Sav (1987) find that state supported schools are more
successful at enrolling but not graduating minority students. Lower graduation rates are a
more likely outcome than lower graduation standards because the faculty retains control
over graduation standards and they have little incentive to reduce the standards.
4 See The Student Advantage Guide to The 310 Best Colleges (1997) for more details
concerning the survey. The Princeton Review claims that the survey is conducted
randomly. However, they also admit to advertising that they will be on campus, which
suggests that they may not receive an unbiased group of respondents. It is not obvious
whether or not this process creates an upward or downward bias in response. However, as
long as the process is consistent across institutions there is no reason to expect a bias
across institutions.
5 There are several different organizations that rate colleges and universities using various
criteria. However, they usually either do not rate all colleges and universities or rate
different groups using different criteria. One exception is the Gourman Report, which
provides a single numerical rating for over 1200 undergraduate colleges and universities.
While the rating is directly comparable across colleges and universities, it is not useful
for our purposes because the ratings are based in part on the sources of the college’s
financing. The same is also true of less inclusive ratings.
6 Financial data was actually available for 302 institutions but the U.S. Naval Academy
and U.S. Military Institute were eliminated from the sample because the requirement to
serve in the military upon graduation implies an implicit tuition cost that is difficult to
calculate. Deep Springs College was also eliminated because all students are required to
work instead of paying tuition and because it offers only a two-year non-degree program.
Of the remaining eight schools for which IPEDs data is not available, two are Canadian
Universities, two are colleges within larger universities, and four are specialty art or
music schools. IPEDs financial data was not available for the 1995-96 academic year
when this research was initiated. All estimates in the paper have also been produced
using the 1992-1993 and 1993-94 financial data instead of the 1994-1995 data. The
results are similar suggesting that having the data from 1995-1996 IPEDs would not
significantly alter the results. In addition, given that each school is surveyed once in a
three-year period, the 1994-1995 financial data is actually in the middle of the sample
period.
7 Doctoral granting institutions include Carnegie classifications 11 (Research Universities
I), 12 (Research Universities II), 13 (Doctoral Universities I), 14 (Doctoral Universities
II). Master’s universities include Carnegie classifications 21 (Master’s I) and 22
(Master’s II). Liberal arts colleges include Carnegie classifications 31 (Baccalaureate I)
and 32 (Baccalaureate II). The specialty institutions include schools of art, music, and
design (Carnegie Classification 56), schools of business and management (Carnegie
Classification 55), and schools of engineering and technology (Carnegie Classification
54). Specialty schools may offer advanced degrees.                                                                                                                                           
8 The local, federal, and state expenditures variable includes funds for student financial
aid. The results are very similar if the aid component is excluded.
9 Using total expenditures per student instead of teaching expenditures per student
produces similar results.